Trade Regulations - Price Discrimination by Schifino, Andrew M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 4 Number 4 Article 8 
1965 
Trade Regulations - Price Discrimination 
Andrew M. Schifino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew M. Schifino, Trade Regulations - Price Discrimination, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 604 (1965). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol4/iss4/8 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:604
TRADE REGULATIONS-Price Discrimination-Consumer acceptance does
not sufficiently differentiate physically identical goods for the purpose of
determining the jurisdictional requirement of "like grade and quality"
under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act.
Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Borden Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1092 (1966).
The path of unconstrained evasion' of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act2 has been closed by the United
States Supreme Court.' In a significant and far-reaching decision the
Court held that brands and labels do not differentiate products for the
purpose of determining grade or quality under section 2(a) of the Act.4
By settling a heretofore unsettled question, this decision not only touched
upon one of the "legal frontiers" of the Robinson-Patman Act, but indeed,
it preserved the very Act itself from the legal graveyard.
Respondent, the Borden Company, manufactures and sells evaporated
milk under the Borden brand name, a nationally advertised brand. Borden
also markets evaporated milk under various private labels owned by its
customers. All of the milk is manufactured and packed in substantially
the same manner, except that different labels are affixed to the cans. The
Borden brand and the private label milk are chemically identical.' How-
ever, the Borden Company has consistently sold the private label milk
at prices lower than that charged for the Borden brand.6 In view of this
discriminatory pricing practice, the Federal Trade Commission7 brought
an action against Borden alleging price discrimination in violation of
1. This path was opened by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
See, Borden Company v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
2. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1936).
3. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Borden Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1092 (1966).
4. Section 2(a) provides in pertinent part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, . . . either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, . . . and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936). [Emphasis supplied.]
5. The record disclosed this fact to be undisputed.
6. It was found that the private label milk was sold F.O.B. at a price determined by a
cost-plus formula. The price varied from plant to plant and from month to month depending
upon the time and place of shipment. It was also established that the private label price
was always lower than the Borden brand price, which was sold at a uniform charge
throughout the country.
7. Hereinafter referred to as "Commission."
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section 2 (a).' On appeal9 to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, it was held, contrary to a long-standing Commission inter-
pretation,1" that the jurisdictional requirement of "like grade and quality"
had not been established in the case. The court adopted the position that
although the two products" were chemically the same, commercially they
were quite different. One was a premium product, the other a non-premium
product, and they should be priced accordingly. The court concluded
that:
In determining whether products are of like grade and quality,
consideration should be given to all commercially significant
distinctions which affect market value, whether they be physical
or promotional.'2
Thus, the court of appeals sanctioned a practice which the Robinson-
Patman amendment to the Clayton Act intended to restrain.
The Supreme Court rejected this shallow construction of section 2 (a).
The Court embraced the Commission's interpretation that labels do not
differentiate products for the purpose of determining grade or quality
and stating that this represents a more reasonable construction of the
statute than that offered by the circuit court. This view is correct, even
though one label may have more customer appeal and command a higher
price in the marketplace. Furthermore, when the attitude of Congress
concerning this question is gleaned from the legislative history, it supports
the Commission's interpretation of the Act rather than that of the court
of appeals. The Court pointed out during the 1936 hearings on the
Robinson-Patman amendment, it was proposed that section 2(a) be
amended to apply only to sales of commodities of "like grade, quality
and brand."' 3 The proposal was intended to put the practice of a man-
8. A price discrimination within the meaning of section 2 (a) is merely a price difference.
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
9. The Hearing Examiner found a price discrimination within the meaning of the
statute. However, he found no injury to competition and held the difference in price was
cost-justified in any event.
The Commission reversed the Hearing Examiner. Potential injury to competition within
the meaning of the Act was found, and the cost-justification defense was rejected. A cease
and desist order was issued by the Commission.
The cost-justification defense was not pursued on appeal by Borden. Borden Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 1.
10. The Commission's view has always been that labels do not differentiate products
for the purpose of determining grade or quality under section 2(a). See, Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); Page
Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953); Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958 (1955).
11. These products included the Borden brand milk and the private brand milk.
12. Borden Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 1, at 137.
13. Hearings on H.R. 4995 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 421 (1936).
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ufacturer selling his nationally advertised brand product at a different
price from his private label beyond the reach of the statute. The recom-
mended amendment met with vigorous objection and was rejected by the
Committee.
14
The purpose and policy of the Robinson-Patman Act is furthered by
the Commission's construction of the Statute, whereas the court of
appeals' interpretation frustrates the aim and in fact destroys the primary
difference between section 2(a) and "old" section 2 of the Clayton Act.
Under the unamended section 2, a seller could legally extend discrimina-
tory prices to the "volume" buyer without justification or excuse." The
so-called "volume discount" or "volume price" could be based merely
upon the quantity purchased. It was not required that the price differen-
tial be reasonably related to a cost differential.'" Consequently, the mass
buying power of the chain stores provided them with a competitive ad-
vantage in the marketplace. The effects of this situation were felt by all
small independent wholesalers and retailers. The Robinson-Patman
amendment was enacted to cure this competitive malady. Thus, in this
sense, the Act is remedial in nature and as such should be strictly con-
strued to effectuate its purpose. If, for example, by permitting a mere
change in the label of a physically identical product to sufficiently differ-
entiate the grade and quality of the commodity for purposes of section
2 (a), the situation which prevailed under the unamended section 2 would
be regenerated. The seller could once again grant to the large buyer a
"volume" price by merely attaching a different label to the product. The
main thrust of section 2 (a), however, is to curtail unjustified price differ-
ences. A seller may discriminate in the price of two or more brands of a
physically identical product if he can justify the price difference under one
of the defenses provided in the Act.' Thus, in this case, Borden could
sell its private brand milk at a price lower than that charged for the
Borden brand if a reasonable cost difference in marketing could be shown.
The Court, clearly consistent with the purpose, policy and intent of the
Robinson-Patman Act, noted:
We doubt that Congress intended to foreclose . . . inquiries in
situations where a single seller markets the identical product
under several different brands, whether his own, his customers
or both. Such transactions are too laden with potential discrimi-
nation and adverse competitive effect to be excluded from the
reach of section 2 (a) by permitting a difference in grade to be
14. Ibid.
15. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.
1939).
16. Ibid.
17. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
and (b) (1936).
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established by the label alone or by the label and its consumer
appeal.' 8 [Emphasis added.]
The adverse competitive effect referred to here is that which Robinson-
Patman intended to alleviate.' 9
The Commission's construction adopted by the Court was criticized
in a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart.2" The dissent, in advocat-
ing the position of the court of appeals, argued that the Commission's
determination of "like grade and quality" under section 2(a) is incon-
sistent with the position it has assumed under section 2(b). That is, in
cases where the discriminating seller has offered the defense that he is
meeting competition in good faith it has been accepted.2' In such cases
the Commission has declared consumer preference to be a necessary
consideration under section 2(b) in determining whether the seller is
meeting or undercutting competition. 2 Thus, the "good faith meeting of
competition defense" is disallowed where the product enjoys a "premium"
reputation among consumers.
Essentially, the dissent's argument is reduced to the following: If
demonstrable consumer preference for a product is recognized to pre-
vent a defendant seller from successfully asserting the section 2(b) de-
fense, then it is inconsistent for the Commission and the courts to deny
this recognition when determining the applicability of section 2(a).
Superficially, this argument seems appealing and logical. However, a
meaningful examination of the purpose of the Act shows the specious na-
ture of the dissent's argument. The purpose of the Act is to provide a
framework within which equal opportunity for all businessmen prevails.
This aim is effectuated by section 2(a) which proscribes direct and in-
direct price discrimination between different purchasers under similar con-
18. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Borden Co., supra note 3, at 1097.
19. The practice of unjustified price discrimination in the pre-Robinson-Patman years
stimulated a trend toward fewer buyers and fewer sellers. This is a trend toward oligopoly
and monopoly. 80 CoNG. REc. part 4, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4683 (1936).
20. Mr. Justice Harlan joined with Justice Stewart in the dissent. Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Borden Co., supra note 3, at 1099.
21. Section 2(b) provides in part:
Upon proof being made . .. , that there has been discrimination in price . . . , the
burden of rebutting the prima fade case . . . by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation. . . and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimina-
tion: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . to
any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor ...
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1936).
22. See, Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923 (1952); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
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ditions.23 The Act does not condemn every price differential, but rather
those which cannot be justified under one of the "provisos" of the statute.24
The "provisos" make available certain specific affirmative defenses, one
of which is section 2(b).2 The defenses can be, and indeed must be
carefully limited so as not to nullify the purpose of the Act.
The recognition of "consumer preference" in considering the section
2(b) defense is a necessary limitation which gives effect to the intent of
the statute. If such "preference" was not recognized, a convenient escape
hatch would be open to large manufacturers allowing them to circumvent
and indeed undermine the Act. The opportunity for classic territorial
price discrimination would be available to the manufacturing giants.
They could literally devastate the small local manufacturer by reducing
the price of their "premium" product to exactly match that of the local
product and thereby capture a significant share of the market on the
strength of sheer economic power rather than competitive skills.2" In
23. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936).
24. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) and (b) (1936).
25. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1936).
26. For example, consider the following hypothetical situation: Colossal Mfg. Co.
markets the "Colossal" brand zweck, a nationally advertised brand which enjoys consumer
acceptance as a premium zweck. Several small local manufacturers also produce and market
a zweck in various areas throughout the country. These zwecks are not regarded as a
premium product, thus are sold for a price which is attractively lower than that charged
for the "Colossal" zweck. Colossal decides it wants a larger share of the market in area X.
The price of the premium "Colossal" zweck is lowered to exactly match that of the local
manufacturers throughout area X. The highly probable consequence of this action would
be the rapid decline of local brand zweck sales with an equally rapid increase in Colossal
sales. If "consumer acceptance" was disregarded under section 2(b), then in any action
brought against Colossal under section 2(a), Colossal could successfully defend by asserting
the section 2(b) defense. This could be repeated in area Y, area Z, etc. The effect of this
would be a motion toward fewer zweck sellers-the destruction of primary-line zweck
competition. Clearly, this is contrary to the intent of the Robinson-Patman Act.
For a case which demonstrates the effects of such a price reduction on a premium
product, see, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
The Commission found the phenomenal increase in "premium" Budweiser beer sales
(during an eight-month period, Anheuser-Busch's market share leaped from 16.55% to
39.3%) was directly due to a price reduction which lowered the price of "Bud" to exactly
match that of the local beers in the St. Louis market area. Hearing Examiner Frank Hier
commented, "I have rarely seen such a dramatic exhibition of economic power and price
sensitivity in so short a time." Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra at 286.
On appeal, the circuit court found the incredible market shifts to be a consequence of
factors other than the price-cut. In arriving at this conclusion, the court considered not only
the period of the price reduction, but also an eleven-month period that followed; during
which the price of Budweiser and the relative market shares were restored to former levels.
However, upon careful analysis of the relevant "eight-month price reduction period," it
seems patently clear that the pronounced market shifts were due to the lower price of
Budweiser, which exactly matched that of local competitors. See, Murray & Fixler, Area
Price Discrimination: A Workable Concept of injury to Competitors, 23 U. PTrr. L. REv. 893
(1962).
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addition, section 2(a) is directed to the protection of primary-line,
secondary-line and tertiary-line competition27 while section 2 (b) is con-
fined in scope to primary-line competition-actual competitors of the
discriminating seller.28
It is clear that the majority opinion discharged the Court's respon-
sibility to effect the legislative intent.. Thus, the Robinson-Patman funeral
procession signalled in the Fifth Circuit was halted and new life restored
to the Act. The Commission's construction adopted by the Supreme
Court in this case is the only one warranted by the purpose of the Act.
The basic underlying policy of all anti-trust legislation is the preserva-
tion of competition. The Court's decision here is consistent with that
policy.
Andrew M. Schifino
SALEs-Uniform Commercial Code-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
completely ignored the Uniform Commercial Code in a case where the
Code was applicable.
C.I.T. Corp. v. lonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 214 A.2d 620 (1965).
In 1961, the Commercial Appliance Company sold equipment to Miracle
Lanes, Inc. under a conditional sales contract.1 The Commercial Appliance
Company then assigned its rights under the contract to the C.I.T. Cor-
poration, which had financed the transaction.
In 1964, Miracle Lanes, Inc. assigned the lease for a cocktail lounge,
where the equipment was located, to Penn Hills Center, Inc. The plaintiff,
C.I.T. Corporation, through its authorized agent, was informed of and
consented to the assignment with full knowledge that the payments
would thereafter be made by the assignee, Penn Hills Center, Inc. When
the installment payments ceased, the C.I.T. Corporation brought an
action in assumpsit against the defendants, Miracle Lanes and Mr. Jonnet.
The defendants alleged that through the circumstances surrounding the
assignment they were released from further liability on the original
contract.
The lower court granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
plaintiff. The defendants appealed, contending that the evidence of a sub-
sequent parol agreement was sufficient to raise the issue of modification
of the original contract.
27. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936).
28. See, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
1. Elmer J. Jonnet, Jr. guaranteed in writing, as a surety, Miracle Lanes' obligations
under the contract.
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